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ABSTRACT
It is well-established that policy aiming to change individual consump-
tion patterns for environmental or other ethical reasons faces a trade- 
off between effectiveness and public acceptance. The more ambitious 
a policy intervention is, the higher the likelihood of reactionary back-
lash; the higher the intervention’s public acceptance, the less bite it is 
likely to have. This paper proposes a package of interventions aiming 
for a substantial reduction of animal product consumption while 
circumventing the diagnosed trade-off. It couples stringent industry 
regulation, which lowers output and raises prices, with a targeted 
universal income at a level which would allow typical households to 
maintain their animal product consumption even at the post- 
regulation price level. The change of opportunity costs of animal 
products, however, would induce a shift of consumption away from 
animal products while enhancing – rather than diminishing – consu-
mer freedom and welfare. The policy package, which is further 
designed to cohere with traditional value orderings rather than relying 
exclusively on progressive concerns, is politically ambitious, but psy-
chologically pragmatic. It constitutes an attempt to socialize the 
endeavor of bringing consumption patterns in line with ethical 
demands by empowering, rather than sanctioning, individuals, and 
relevant groups.
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1. Introduction
The consumption of animal products is harmful in various overlapping ways. Besides 
harming animals in unredeemable ways, it harms the environment, it harms the climate, it 
harms the poor, and it arguably harms the consumers, too.1 Since free markets are 
unlikely to deliver a significant2 reduction of animal product consumption3 any time 
soon, it is natural to wonder about the prospects of changing the conditions within 
which the markets operate. Unfortunately, there are formidable challenges to addressing 
the issue of animal product consumption by way of policy intervention. Firstly, the 
consumption of animal products, particularly meat, is deeply entrenched in everyday 
culture. Changing it means changing us, and policy proposals with this goal have 
frequently met with hostile resistance.4 Secondly, most of the costs of animal product 
consumption, including but going well beyond the harm it does to animals, are not – in 
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some cases: not yet – immediately felt by consumers. This makes it difficult to convince an 
already reluctant public of the reasonableness of policy aimed at reducing it.
Noting the difficulty of bringing down ethically harmful individual consumption through 
policy, some scholars have recently turned to the idea of ‘packaging’ policy interventions.5 
‘Packages’ of interventions bundled together, the idea goes, may have a better chance than 
free-standing interventions in bringing about change while avoiding backlash. While we 
applaud this endeavor and seek to contribute to it, we find that the literature on ‘packaging’ 
contains significant lacunae. For one thing, the ‘packages’ discussed so far have focused on 
tax- and prohibition-based policy combinations and neglected viable alternatives. For 
another, there has only been a very thin discussion of the rationales of ‘packaging’. The 
academic discussion has focused on the expected public acceptance of (a narrow slice of) 
policy packages and largely ignored more general ethical and psychological reasons for or 
against certain packages.
sIn this paper, we will address these issues in the course of proposing and discussing 
a specific policy package. The package we will put forward consists of two core elements. 
The first is the implementation of stringent regulation aiming at better aligning the 
production of meat and other animal products with ethical demands. These regulations 
will sharply decrease the supply of animal products, thereby raising their prices significantly. 
The second element is a limited universal income aimed at offsetting the negative welfare 
impact of animal products’ increased prices. The universal income is tuned such that 
individual households could retain the pre-policy level of animal product consumption. Of 
course, though, they can also use the income in different ways. If the opportunity cost6 of 
animal products rises sufficiently, households will shift away from animal product consump-
tion. Since the consumption shift is not forced, it will be at least welfare-neutral. This policy 
combination, which adds a degree of freedom to citizens (rather than diminishing freedom) 
and which aligns consumption reduction with consumers’ self-interest, is further designed 
to be compatible with traditional value orderings, rather than appealing only to progressive 
or ecological concerns. This aspect of the proposal, like the enhanced freedom and the 
alignment of consumption reduction with self-interest, is meant to avoid backlash and 
provide further motivational underpinnings to the needed sustained behavior changes.
We are not attempting an empirical study of the likelihood of public acceptance 
of the proposed package in this paper. We think that proposals which introduce 
radical changes to opportunity costs, yet which include similarly radical income 
measures, are hardly amenable to study under laboratory conditions or by survey. 
The appropriate kind of discussion is of a normative nature, and to that, we seek to 
contribute in this paper. At the same time, we believe that the proposal can inspire 
some general hypotheses about appropriate packaging principles, and we shall also 
discuss those.
In what follows, we will first briefly discuss the problem of reactionary backlash against 
environmentally or (otherwise) ethically oriented policy, and ideas to circumvent it with policy 
packages (Section 2). After indicating the literature’s blind-spots, we will introduce the policy 
proposal, discussing its incentive- and disincentive-structure, differences with competing 
proposals, and its central design principles (Section 3). Section (4) will be devoted to rebutting 
some normative arguments against the proposal, and in section (5), we will discuss some 
general lessons that can be drawn from the proposal and its discussion.
2 M. KIESSELBACH AND E. PISSARSKOI
2. Ethically Oriented Policy and Its Public Acceptance
The literature on the public acceptance of policy interventions is not new but has recently 
started to attract increased attention. This is particularly the case with respect to policy in 
the fields of sustainability and environmental protection, where the recent past has 
witnessed many cases of backlash against policy aimed at changing individual behavior 
(c.f. Carattini et al., 2018; Drews & van den Bergh, 2015; Levi et al., 2020). The increasing 
urgency of combating the climate crisis and other aspects of large-scale and potentially 
catastrophic ecological degradation stand in the background to this surge in interest.
Much of the literature on the public acceptance of policy measures addressing ethically 
objectionable consumption corroborates the existence of a trade-off: the more bite an 
intervention has, the more likely it is to meet with public hostility. Conversely, the higher 
the expected acceptance, the lower the likelihood that it will make an actual dent.7 The 
thesis of such a trade-off, variants of which have been established in different fields of 
policy,8 poses an obvious challenge for scholars and activists alike. Is there any way to 
circumvent the trade-off?
General studies of factors increasing or decreasing the likelihood of public acceptance 
of individual policy measures have yielded some useful data,9 but have not been able to 
identify clear paths around the trade-off.
Recently, scholars have turned to this challenge by discussing ‘packages’ of policy 
interventions. Bundled together, the idea goes, policy measures may have a better chance 
than free-standing interventions to provide feasible pathways to ethically superior states.
Most of the relevant literature in the fields of public economics and behavioral and 
political science takes carbon taxation as the core policy instrument and analyzes the 
public acceptance of different ways of spending the tax revenue (Bachus et al., 2019; 
Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Carattini et al., 2018; Klenert et al., 2018; Maestre-Andrés 
et al., 2019; Raymond, 2019). All these studies support the claim that the ‘recycling’ of 
revenues can increase public acceptance of carbon taxes. Regarding the optimal scheme 
for the recycling of tax revenues, there is no clear evidence, suggesting that the design of 
a particular spending scheme depends on particular political circumstances (c.f. Beiser- 
McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Klenert et al., 2018; Raymond, 2019). At any rate, the findings 
are in line with the conclusions of Bicket and Vanner (2016), who argue that a cost or tax is 
more likely to be accepted if the generated funds flow into visible and defined 
programmes.
There are also critical voices with regard to tax-based approaches to climate policy, of 
course. For example, Rosenbloom et al. (2020) criticize such approaches by arguing that 
carbon taxation is not the most effective climate policy, concluding that it should not be 
considered as the primary policy strategy.
Regarding packaging options for food policies, the literature is much more scarce. 
Grimsrud et al. (2019) provide some evidence that an individual’s willingness to pay a tax 
on red meat increases if the tax revenue is earmarked for environmental protection 
projects. In a recent study, Fesenfeld et al. (2020) analyze which policy packages aiming 
to reduce meat consumption circumvent the trade-off between effectiveness and political 
feasibility by the means of behavioral experiments. They examine individuals’ preferences 
about packages consisting of six randomly assigned food policy instruments and end up 
supporting the claim that ‘combining costly and beneficial policy instruments into policy 
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packages can mitigate (the dilemma) between effectiveness and political feasibility’ 
(Fesenfeld et al., 2020, p. 179).
It is safe to say that although it has produced some new and valuable knowledge about 
influences on public acceptance, the existing research has not yet yielded a breakthrough 
answer to the question which precise combination of policy instruments directed at 
a reduction of animal product consumption avoids the trade-off, combining a high 
degree of impact with a high degree of public acceptance.
We believe that an answer to this question cannot be furnished by empirical research 
alone but needs to be looked for in the field of normative considerations. This is so for three 
reasons. Firstly, typical empirical approaches in microeconomics or psychology would 
concentrate on people’s given preference structures. Preference structures, however, are 
referenced to, and limited by, practical surroundings. Introduce radical changes to these 
surroundings, and preferences lose their stability (c.f. Bowles, 1998; Dietz & Hepburn, 2013; 
Mattauch & Hepburn, 2016). Arguably, the change of possibilities and opportunity costs 
effected by the policy package sketched in this paper’s introduction would be sufficiently 
radical to render preferences, and hence research on preferences by survey or in lab 
conditions, unstable. We may not know now how we would react under conditions created 
by the policy package, and we may also not know whether we would prefer these condi-
tions to the status quo, or vice versa. Secondly and relatedly, when confronted with 
scenarios radically unlike the status quo, our deliberation switches from introspection 
about preferences to normative reasoning. When asked whether we would like or choose 
such a state, we parse the question about the proposal’s acceptability as one about its 
reasonableness or justice. Thirdly, normative or moral considerations are always implicit in 
policy design and deliberation, going far beyond the policy’s ultimate goals. Unless they are 
turned explicit, it is impossible to inspect, discuss and improve upon them.
The importance of taking the moral dimension seriously in the field of sustainability 
policy has recently been acknowledged by Creutzig (2019). However, the place of morals 
in Creutzig’s proposal is mainly that of a psychological motivator: besides the two ‘pillars’ 
of carbon taxes and the use of their revenues for infrastructure building, Creutzig argues 
that further moral pressure to divest from fossil fuels is needed to achieve sustainable 
change. While we agree that the moral dimension is paramount in policy justification, and 
even that there is an important place for moral pressure in various arenas of political life, 
we take it to be an advantage of this paper’s particular proposal to work without moral 
pressure as a motivator. With this in view, let us introduce the promised proposal, offer 
elements of its normative justification, and show how it respects the moral nature of the 
matter at hand in a way which goes beyond previous discussions of ‘policy packaging’.
3. A Pragmatic Proposal: Less Animal Product Consumption, but More 
Freedom
3.1. The Proposal and Its Mechanics
The proposal we wish to put forward consists of two core elements. The first element is 
stringent ethically oriented regulation of the supply of animal products, which aims at 
better aligning production with the demands of animal rights and intergenerational 
justice. Demands of intergenerational justice require at least that humanity does not 
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transgress the so-called Planetary Boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015) – 
i.e. thresholds in certain critical natural systems – for their transgression jeopardizes moral 
rights of future generations. Livestock keeping has significant direct impacts on at least 
two natural systems which are already close to the threshold values of Planetary 
Boundaries: climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases, and biogeochem-
ical flows (nitrogen and phosphorus flows) through manure runoff.10 This justifies regula-
tion with the goal of reducing greenhouse gases, nitrogen, and phosphorus emissions 
from livestock farming to a level which would be consistent with humanity’s staying 
within the Planetary Boundaries. What exactly such a regulation would imply for livestock 
husbandry is not relevant here, because the demands of animal rights justify much tighter 
restrictions. Respect of animal rights requires providing animals the opportunity to lead 
decent lives according to the needs and typical behaviors of their respective species, 
which implies at least the granting of sufficient space for movement, adequate feed and 
refraining from bodily interferences such as castration (unless required for the animal’s 
health). Specifying the exact content of what animal rights amount to lies beyond the 
aims of this paper and would require its own discussion.11 However, it is clear that 
regulation aiming to respect animal rights would drastically lower the supply of animal 
products. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the overall production of animal 
products will shrink by a range of 80% relative to today’s levels. This will cause a drastic 
increase in the prices of animal products.
This is where the second ingredient of our package comes in: the introduction of 
a limited unconditional income. The idea of an unconditional basic income, or negative 
taxes, has been discussed in policy circles for a few decades now. Today, a rich normative 
(Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017), theoretical (Ghatak & Maniquet, 2019), and empirical litera-
ture (Delsen, 2019) on the topic exists. The idea of an unconditional income is certainly 
controversial, both with regard to its normative justification and with regard to its empirical 
feasibility. We shall not dive into these debates, however, since the policy instrument we are 
suggesting is more modest than the scheme usually discussed in the literature and is 
supported by independent moral reasons. In particular, the most pressing normative 
objection against an unconditional income – the reciprocity objection, which states that 
unconditional income allows (or even encourages) free-riding – is not decisive against the 
policy, if the considerations of animal rights and ecological protection are sound.12
The idea we want to put forward, then, is to introduce, as part of the intervention package 
under discussion, a limited universal income at precisely the level that the average household 
would need in order to maintain the pre-intervention level of animal product consumption at 
the increased prices of animal products due to the package’s regulation element.
The financial effect of the two interventions in combination are added material resources 
for each household to choose its consumption bundle. Individual households can choose to 
remain at the status quo, with an unaltered level of animal product consumption (while the 
produce will presumably be of higher quality due to the imposed regulations). But they can 
also choose to spend their additional income on things other than animal products. 
Abstracting from the question of how to finance the universal income (we shall turn to 
this issue in section 4.2), households will hence gain – rather than lose – a degree of freedom 
in their consumption and saving decisions. A better-than-welfare-neutral reduction of 
overall animal product demand is expected, as the rise of animal products’ opportunity 
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costs will lead households to shift their income to other consumption or saving without 
being forced to do so.
We accept that the policy package, as sketched here, most probably cannot be 
implemented in one step. Regulation requiring the keeping of livestock in compliance 
or near-compliance with animal rights substantially reduces production potential for 
animal products (we assumed a range of 80%). If consumers initially stick to their 
consumption habits after the introduction of such a regulation, prices for animal products 
will rise infinitely. Practically, there will just not be enough animal products in order to 
meet consumer demand, and no basic income would be capable of bridging the gap. As 
acknowledged above, this shows that our proposal involves the assumption that demand 
for animal products is sufficiently elastic with regard to prices, at least at the levels we 
propose. But there is another assumption in play: we take it that the price elasticity of 
demand for a particular kind of product is not a constant.13 Consumers’ price elasticity of 
demand varies over time, it depends on consumers’ knowledge of available substitutes 
and relative prices of the latter. Both these determinants of price elasticity of animal 
products will vary as a result of restrictions on livestock keeping, and they can be 
additionally influenced by further policy measures. Relative prices of vegetable alterna-
tives to animal products will be reduced if prices for animal products rise. If consumers get 
acquainted with vegetable substitutes, animal products will become much more price 
elastic. Such a societal learning can be supported politically. Since, at any rate, the buildup 
of price elasticity is not instantaneous, it may be necessary to implement the policy 
package in several steps, which are spread out over some time. This should be possible, 
as one of the proposal’s theoretical benefits is its scalability, and hence its adjustability.
We should also acknowledge that setting the level of the universal income to corre-
spond to an average household’s consumption level is a pragmatic decision which may 
not be suitable in all contexts.14 There may, for instance, be societies in which consump-
tion of animal products is much less evenly distributed than it is in a typical Western 
country like Germany, and in which animal product consumption may be particularly 
strong in disadvantaged sections of society. In such a society, the benefit of the ease of 
calculation may be outweighed by the injustice of setting the calculation base at the 
average consumption level. With a view to simple presentation, we will continue to go 
with a calculation with average household consumption but note that several competing 
models exist.
Independently of the calculation base for the universal income, the policy package 
proposed here would be costly if it is to be effective. We shall turn to this issue in section 
4.2, which argues that the proposal should be implemented despite its high cost.
3.2. How Does the Proposal Compare with Other Policy Packages?
The policy package we are suggesting consists of two main policy instruments. The first 
directly aims at bringing about a morally better state of the world. Since policy instru-
ments aiming at changing behavior toward morally justified patterns alone meet public 
resistance which often renders policy ineffective – this problem is shared with ‘stick’ 
elements of carrot/stick motivational policy pairs – a further policy instrument is needed 
which influences people’s motivation to accept the morally desired changes. This latter 
compensatory, or restorative, element will assuage opposition; it shares this feature with 
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‘carrot’ elements of carrot/stick motivational policy pairs. Much of the academic literature 
accepts that these two types of instruments – limiting and compensatory – are needed for 
a policy package to be successful (c.f. Fesenfeld et al., 2020; Klenert et al., 2018). The 
disputed question is what instruments of these two types should be combined.
There are several limiting policy instruments aiming at changing individual’s behavior 
in a politically intended direction (c.f. Garnett, 2014, Table 2; Lemken et al., 2018; Green & 
Gambhir, 2019, for a review of available policy instruments): regulation and legislation; 
fiscal measures (taxes and subsidies); nudging; social marketing. Similarly, there are also 
several compensatory policy instruments motivating individuals to accept the desired 
behavioral change: education; financial incentives; unconditioned financial compensa-
tions (negative tax). As a matter of principle, all these instruments can be combined with 
each other, giving rise to the normative question what the best combination of the 
instruments of each type is.
The literature has not systematically discussed this normative question yet. So far, 
scholars have focused on a specific instrument (taxation and ‘revenue recycling’, c.f. 
Klenert et al., 2018, neglecting further options for combination) or they analyzed which 
combinations of instruments align with consumers' preferences (Fesenfeld et al., 2020), or 
they suggested general policy strategies (Rosenbloom et al., 2020). Indeed, our proposal 
can be seen as a specific working-out of Rosenbloom’s et al. strategic observations, 
namely by combining those instruments with the highest efficacy from both types.
The most direct way to realize the morally intended social state – the one in which 
animals are treated in compliance with their rights – is to enforce regulations and laws 
restricting the treatment of animals accordingly.15 This regulation will lead – as discussed 
above – to substantially increased prices for animal products, thereby negatively impact-
ing consumers. The most direct way to counterbalance these potential disadvantages for 
consumers is financial compensation. Thus, we suggest a negative tax or unconditional 
basic income in an amount that compensates the additional expenditures as the second 
element of the policy package.
We contend that packages consisting of a tax on animal products and redistribution of 
revenues do not provide an optimal solution to the moral-motivational problems. Firstly, 
they cannot guarantee that the revenues from the taxation suffice in order to compensate 
the consumers by an amount which would allow them to keep their habitual consump-
tion patterns (if that is aimed for at all). Secondly and more importantly, by putting a tax 
on animal products, the limiting element of such packages addresses the proper moral 
goals indirectly rather than directly: the harm is inflicted on animals in the course of the 
production process of animal products whereas taxation of animal products targets 
individual consumption, thus delegating to consumers the task of addressing the moral 
root problem arising at the production side.
We concede that our proposal imposes higher costs on public budgets relative to other 
packaging proposals, especially compared to the package consisting of taxation and 
revenues-recycling – an instrument that does not impose any additional costs at all. But 
we believe that there are strong reasons to support the socio-ecological transformation of 
established food practices with public expenditure. We shall come back to these reasons 
below (c. f. section 4.2). For now, we wish to register that a publicly financed income as 
part of the policy would amount to treating the problem as a public problem in whose 
solution everybody should have a stake.
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3.3. Compatibility with Traditional Values
One liability of many policy interventions is their disconnect, or perceived disconnect, 
from traditional ways of prioritizing values. If social or intergenerational justice, or the 
respect for animal rights, does not figure highly on the priority list of normative con-
siderations of a large section of society, then an exclusive reliance on such considerations 
can weaken the intervention’s level of public acceptance.
The policy package proposed here is not exclusively reliant on such values but can be 
defended by reference to more traditional considerations, too. Besides preserving – indeed: 
furthering – individual freedom, the package can plausibly be described and interpreted as 
being in the service of (other) values such as quality (the changed production system allows 
for produce of superior quality), health (both better meat, and less meat, have positive 
health outcomes, as does less intensive agriculture), rural welfare or fairness to the farmers 
(who produce less, but at higher prices, and – if this is aspect adequately heeded by the 
regulation – under better working conditions) and tradition (as lower production and better 
produce are marks of agriculture prior to the introduction of factory farming).
All these normative considerations – individual freedom, quality, health, fairness to 
farmers, and tradition – should appeal to persons of a politically conservative mind-set 
and do not require the acceptance of recognizably ‘liberal’ or ‘ecological’ values. Reference 
to them is not meant, in the first place, as a selling strategy within a political marketing 
campaign. At the same time, however, the possibility of internal justification – justification of 
the policy package in terms of values which are already widely accepted by the public, 
rather than in terms of values which are themselves in need of explanation and justification – 
may well be drawn on in political communication. A plausible linking with already held 
values can be a potent barrier to identity-based opposition to the policy package.
We should make explicit that we do not argue that the proposed policy package will 
not be opposed on normative grounds. For instance, persons of a libertarian bent may 
find little to like about the proposal. Not only the regulation, which curtails the liberty of 
producers, but also the basic income element, which is often criticized as subsidizing free- 
riding,16 may well be incompatible with their normative intuitions. Our claim here is more 
modest. It is that the proposal is geared to assuage some of the key concerns, and take 
into account the psychology, of consumers. The possibility of justifying the proposal by 
reference to certain traditional or conservative values is to be seen under this heading.
3.4. Design Principles to Counter Motivation-based Acceptance Barriers
Before moving on to an explicit normative discussion, let us highlight two design principles 
which – along with the respect of individual freedom and the compatibility with traditional 
value orderings – give rise to the hope that the package can break the trade-off between 
public acceptance and efficacy. Firstly, the proposal aligns self-interest with the ethical aims 
of the policy; secondly, the proposal allows for incremental behavior changes at each 
individual’s own chosen speed. Let us begin with the first of these two principles.
Every Euro received by way of the universal income handed out in compensation for 
increased prices of animal products can be spent either on animal products or on other 
things. For this reason, it can realize a higher marginal value than a quantity of animal 
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products worth one Euro, and so utility, or welfare, can increase if overall spending moves 
away from the previous consumption pattern.
In providing monetary motivation for giving up animal products without mandating 
any particular point on the spectrum between no consumption and full previous con-
sumption of animal products, the universal income also allows each person to determine 
the size of their steps in a potential longer term consumption change, and thus behavior 
change. A household can choose any point on the continuum between the status quo 
and full animal product abolition, and it can progress on the spectrum in both directions 
and at any speed.
These two principles, along with the possibility of internal justification in terms of 
traditional values, give individuals positive resources to change themselves without losing 
their agency, or a sense thereof, and without experiencing failure, or risk thereof. Both the 
feeling of heteronomy and the prospect of failure risk lowering a policy’s acceptance rate 
by introducing motivational problems.
It is noteworthy in this context that the policy’s main moral goals – respecting the 
rights of animals and future generations – are broadly accepted by the public (at least in 
Germany, c.f. BMU, 2019, Figures 19 and 20). The problem for the realization of these 
broadly accepted goals lies in the fact that their implementation requires changing 
deeply entrenched habits, customs, and practices. This issue is intimately linked with 
what psychologists refer to as ‘cognitive dissonance’, and our responses to such 
dissonance.17 It is well established that people who experience a mismatch between 
normative goals – even goals which are intellectually accepted by the agents in question – 
on the one hand, and their own capacity of living up to them on the other, have a higher 
propensity to change their normative opinions (and even their view of the relevant facts) 
than to increase their efforts to attain the goals. Put bluntly, rather than foregoing their 
sunday roast, people tend to reinterpret normative and non-normative facts, or their 
dialectical weight (‘animals do not really suffer’, ‘keeping animals as a food-source helps 
the conservation of their species’ etc.) or entrench their identity with respect to the 
incriminated conduct (‘we are meat eaters, and we are proud of it’, ‘bullfighting is an 
ancient tradition, and no one is going to take that away from us’ etc.). The policy’s 
enlisting of traditional values, its alignment of self-interest with behavior change, and 
the granting of freedom with respect to each individual’s steps in a potential longer term 
change, are to be understood as means to counter this propensity.
4. Addressing Some Arguments against the Proposal
So far, we have outlined the proposal and some of the main construction principles 
behind it. In the discussion, we have already (inevitably) hinted at some of the normative 
justifications of the proposal.
It should already be clear that the main justification of the proposal lies in the multi-
faceted wrongness of consuming animals. Further justificatory points specific to the 
proposal at hand include the prominence it gives to individual freedom and the fact 
that its individual elements are the most direct instruments in the toolbox of possible 
interventions. In the previous section, we have also pointed to the expected psychological 
workings of the proposal. In this section, we want to counter some anticipated normative 
arguments against the proposed policy package. We will start with an argument which 
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targets the enterprise of policy packaging in general, and then continue to more specific 
arguments against the proposed package.
4.1. Is the Policy Package Manipulative (Because Its Parts Do Not Require Each 
Other)?
On the face of it, a universal basic income could be introduced in the absence of 
regulation targeting animal products. And conversely: animal products could be more 
strictly regulated without the introduction of a universal basic income. Moreover, even if 
these two interventions are introduced together, the legislature could take one of them 
back later. The mutual independence of the package’s elements may strike observers as 
manipulative: why not discuss and – if viewed positively after discussion – introduce its 
parts separately?
It is true that there is a sense in which the package’s elements are mutually indepen-
dent. Each could be given multiple kinds of justification, and no doubt, each would have 
a complex set of consequences which could also be studied separately. It might also be 
that each could persist without the other.
On the other hand, packaging them has motivational added value, as we have 
attempted to show above. It is only conjointly that the package works in the way sketched 
above, and conjoining its elements strikes us as no more manipulative than designing 
a machine with several parts which also have an effect individually, but which have 
particular – and particularly desired – effects when employed together.
Things would be different, of course, if the policy package were only a device for the 
stealthy introduction of only one of the package’s parts, while the other one is repealed 
soon after the introduction. For example, the package is imaginable as a trick to make 
meat production all but impossible, with no true intention of sticking to the universal 
basic income. Or it could be seen as a maneuver to introduce a universal basic income, 
with no particular intention to do something about animal product consumption. As it 
happens, neither of these plans is behind the proposal presented in this paper, but even if 
it were, it would hardly be a valid counter-argument against the content of the proposal, if 
there are other reasons for the packaging. We take ourselves to have shown that such 
other reasons exist.
4.2. Is the Policy Package Too Expensive?
As already touched upon above, an important advantage of the policy proposal sketched 
in this paper is its scalability. In principle, it could be introduced at very different scales: 
very modest price increases would necessitate only a very modest universal income, and 
more significant price increases would necessitate a higher universal income.
However, important though this point is, we do not want to deny that if the policy is to 
have a significant effect on animal product consumption, its income component would be 
costly. Let us roughly estimate what our proposal could cost. The disposable income in 
Germany amounted to 2400 billion Euro in 2019,18 private consumption expenditures 
accounted for 1720 billion Euro.19 About 4% of private consumption expenditure was 
spent on animal products in the last 15 years20 which amounts to an expenditure of 
about 70 billion Euro annually for animal products. If we assume that the prices of animal 
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products will be driven up roughly five-fold by the envisaged regulation, then the addi-
tional burden on households would be 280 billion Euro (350 billion minus 70 billion) if they 
are to keep their consumption habits of animal products. This sum would have to be 
handed out as universal basic income in a country like Germany. A more moderate scenario, 
with a threefold price increase, would see an additional burden of 140 billion Euro.
In light of the fact that federal tax revenues in 2019 comprised 329 billion Euro21 in 
Germany, and the fact that revenues of the overall public budget were 1500 billion Euro in 
2019 in Germany,22 it is quite clear that implementing the proposal – even in its modest 
form – would constitute a heavy financial burden on the public.
There are three possible sources for financing the basic income: (i) redistribution of 
public revenues; (ii) additional taxes (iii) deficit financing (which implies additional 
costs borne by future generations). These three sources can be combined in various 
ways to generate the required additional public revenues. Here, we cannot discuss in 
detail which combination of sources should be chosen. Since the moral justification of 
our policy package is derived from the moral demands of both future and currently 
living beings (c.f. section 1), there is some prima facie reason for a model of sharing 
the burden (implying a mix of deficit spending (iii) and the other two sources (i) and 
(ii)). To specify how exactly to distribute the financial burdens among generations, in 
particular whether to assign a higher burden to the currently living generation to 
reflect its responsibility for the crises which are one of the motivations behind the 
proposal, would require a more detailed normative and empirical analysis than we 
can provide here. The resulting financing models may differ between states due to 
the differences in their systems of public finances. Additionally, possible injustices in 
the systems of public finances of particular states would need to be addressed when 
tailoring a financing model to a particular economy.
The key moral justification for implementing the policy even if it would cost as much as 
estimated above is its potentially significant contribution in the fight against crass 
injustices causing severe suffering of non-human animals and of the world’s poor, in 
current and future generations. Apart from the harm it does to animals, current consump-
tion of animal products contributes significantly to changes in natural systems which are 
transgressing Planetary Boundaries (c.f. section 3.1). The negative welfare effect of their 
transgression is notoriously difficult to calculate, but it is seriously possible that it dwarfs 
that of catastrophes hitherto experienced. If the policy package succeeds in reducing 
animal product consumption significantly, then it will reduce the probability of cata-
strophic outcomes from changes in critical natural systems. The expected welfare effect 
may well be magnitudes higher than the estimated costs (and this calculation does not 
even take benefits from health impacts into account). In general, the main effect of the 
package’s regulation side is to internalize externalized costs, while the basic income is 
simply an attempt to share them at the society level. The costs, of course, may come 
down. If or when consumption habits change, the universal income part of the package 
could even be phased out entirely.
Of course, there are other defects of justice demanding our attention and resources 
besides animal product consumption and the harms it engenders. We cannot, in the 
space of this paper, provide and defend a ranking of causes on which the necessity to curb 
animal product consumption comes on top. At this point, we would only want to make 
two points. Firstly, while the measure is costly, it still leaves us able to pursue parallel 
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policies aimed at other problems. Secondly and more importantly, a universal income can 
be designed such that it involves a significant redistribution of wealth. This in itself would 
likely make headway in the solution of a number of other important social ills.
4.3. Does the Policy Amount to Bribing People to Behave according to Moral 
Norms?
One might argue that it is wrong to give people money for the non-violation of moral 
norms. It is, after all, arguably wrong to prevent a thief from stealing by paying her/him 
the value of the goods s/he would have stolen otherwise.
We agree that in an ideal world – a world in which no time constraints exist, and in 
which all people are adequately informed and act rationally upon their information – our 
proposal would be morally unjustified. However, the existing world is not ideal in this 
sense: there are informational and cognitive hurdles (many people do not have access to 
the information figuring in this proposal’s premises, or do not process it correctly), there 
are motivational hurdles (people do not do what they believe they ought to do), and there 
are serious time constraints (some Planetary Boundaries have already been transgressed). 
In such a non-ideal world, it is appropriate to employ non-ideal normative theories. That is 
what our proposal amounts to: we do suggest to provide a financial incentive which 
allows individuals to keep the status quo of their well-being and which provides them 
with resources in order to learn how to live in accordance with moral demands which, so 
far, have not yet been internalized in the form of broadly accepted customs and habits.
4.4. Is the Policy Package Unfair to Non-Vegetarians?
There are two reasons for which one might think that our proposal is unfair to 
consumers of animal products. Firstly, one might argue that it is unfair that our proposal 
aims at influencing the consumers of animal products and not the vegans. However, 
even if our proposal discriminated between veganism and carnivorism, it still would not 
be unfair, for there are moral reasons for the discrimination. Moreover, our proposal 
does not offer any basis for claiming that some groups of persons benefit unfairly, 
because it leaves everybody the opportunity to keep their dietary habits, and indeed 
empowers them to do so.jabr
Secondly, one might argue that the policy package is unfair because vegans and 
vegetarians benefit from it more than carnivores do. Since vegans do not consume animal 
products at all, the basic income just constitutes an additional income for them: they are 
fully free in spending the money and gaining additional welfare. In contrast, people who 
have a habit of animal product consumption will need the additional income just to keep 
their welfare level at the same level. Thus, although everybody gets the same monetary 
income, in terms of welfare gains, vegans and vegetarians benefit stronger than meat 
consumers.
This objection does not convince, either. Welfare gains do not depend on dietary 
habits of individuals. The difference between consumers of animal products and vegans 
lies in the fact that the former will experience welfare losses from regulation of the 
production of animal products whereas the welfare of the latter won’t be changed by 
the regulation. However, the regulation will merely ensure that the production proceeds 
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in accordance with moral norms. It is not unjust to experience welfare losses from 
regulation which secures compliance with principles of justice or other ethical demands.
4.5. Is the Policy Package Manipulative (Because It Employs Motivational Tricks)?
We anticipate two kinds of argument to the effect that there is something manipulative 
about the proposal. Firstly, while its fundamental aim is a reduction of animal product 
consumption, the policy proposal employs a rather complicated machinery to get people 
to reduce their animal product consumption, rather than openly appealing to citizens, or 
presenting normative arguments to them. Secondly, the claim of compatibility with 
traditional, or conservative, ways of prioritizing values could be interpreted as manipula-
tive, because it obscures the fundamental reasons for which legislators or policy advisors 
will find the policy attractive (to the extent that they do).
Let us play with open cards. The most important normative reasons for the policy, in 
our view, are the avoidance of harm to animals, and the preservation of conditions for 
humanity’s survival. Further, we do think that as things stand, preaching these aims and 
showing what follows from them, may have insufficient motivational impact. Even those 
who accept these aims intellectually cannot be expected, for the reason of their intellec-
tual grasp or acceptance of the aims alone, to act in accordance with them. We do think 
that further motivational help is needed, and we take both the inclusion of a universal 
income and the compatibility with conservative values to constitute such help.
In arguing for a policy which furnishes such motivational help, there is a sense in which 
we treat citizens as ‘less’ than fully rational deciders without any motivational friction. But 
doing so need not be manipulative, and not merely because the view of humans as fully 
rational creatures, who never display the psychological defects sketched above, is an 
illusion. We would argue that manipulation, correctly understood, obtains if subjects, 
once fully informed about the workings of the policy – and perhaps the ultimate aims of 
its backers –, would reverse their erstwhile acceptance. We do not see that this is the case. 
Firstly, there is nothing actually undesirable about being afforded an additional degree of 
freedom, as the combination of price-raising regulation and universal income does. 
Secondly, the claim that the proposal is compatible with conservative values is true. As 
we tried to make clear, the point is to be seen under the heading of internal justification, 
not marketing. And internal justification, i.e. justification in terms of the values of one’s 
interlocutor, is not manipulative as long as the justification is transparent. Thirdly, the 
‘conservative values’ are (typically) not actually rejected by non-conservatives. They may 
be afforded lower priorities in the ordering of normative considerations of persons who 
would self-identify as ‘progressives’, thus potentially losing out against other considera-
tions when a choice is forced. But health or quality considerations, even considerations of 
tradition, may be fully accepted even by non-conservatives as respectable reasons in 
political debate. For these reasons, a fully informed citizen would have no reason to 
change their view of the proposal’s acceptability or to complain about it.
4.6. Is the Policy Package Politically Unrealistic?
It is quite clear that the introduction of the policy package discussed in this paper faces 
significant hurdles.
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One obvious example of a legal hurdle is the existence of rules and systems enshrining 
the openness of markets. With cheap meat and other animal products flowing into 
a country unhindered, however, the policy package is a nonstarter: it would kill much of 
the domestic agriculture sector, while doing nothing to change consumption. Here, 
a reform allowing environmentally or ethically mandated import restrictions (like import 
of alcohol or drugs) would indeed be needed for the proposed policy package to work. 
And of course, organizations like the EU or even the WTO are notoriously difficult to 
reform. At this point, all we can do is accept these barriers, but point out that they are not 
insurmountable, particularly given the urgency of the fight against climate change, and 
the growing awareness of the latter.
Let us also register the reminder that not all the aspects of the practical outlook for the 
implementation of the proposed policy are bad. One not yet discussed aspect of the 
proposal is its potential of enlisting the support of the farming community due to its 
expected positive impact on farmers’ earning and working conditions. This may not be 
the case for all sections of the farming community. For those who are strongly invested in 
intensive and technology-heavy farming, it may well be difficult or impossible to change 
production modes – and downscale production – without investment losses. There 
would, in other words, be losers. But smaller farms with less such investment, higher 
diversity of produce and higher flexibility, may well be significant winners of the policy 
introduction in different dimensions. This, in turn, could yield a breakup of the current 
coalition of the farming community on the one hand, and large agro-business and meat 
processing on the other hand. The support of farmers, freed from their current coalition 
with agro-business, would not only be an asset in the endeavor to implement the policy. 
Due to the immense financial might of agro-business and meat-processing, and the 
latters’ current public relations strategy of benefiting from the positive public image of 
farmers and farming, this breakup could also be valuable for other ecological causes.
In short, it does little help to deny that the policy proposal faces significant legal 
obstacles and powerful coalitions opposed to it. However, laws can be changed demo-
cratically, and reactionary coalitions can be broken up given the political will.
5. Concluding Remarks
The policy package described in this paper follows construction principles on different 
levels. In order to further clarify them, but also with a view to possible uptake in 
neighboring or more general policy debates, let us conclude this paper by summarizing 
the central principles along with their justificatory interrelationships.
We have already emphasized that an important aspect of the proposal is the commit-
ment to align individual consumption change with individuals’ self-interest. We have also 
emphasized the principle of freedom, which corresponds with the preference for inviting 
change over enforcing it. Moreover, we have stressed the importance of allowing people 
to set their own speed in their adaption to the policy and to ethical demands, and of 
avoiding exclusive reliance on the acceptance of progressive values.
These principles may be thought to be distinctly ‘soft’. We agree that their motivation 
lies in taking people as they are, with their – our – human psychology as it is, rather than 
assuming a psyche more amenable to intervention by moral appeal. We prefer to describe 
this aspect of the proposal as psychological pragmatism and see in it an important 
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principle on a higher level. A proposal which is pragmatic in the sketched sense need not 
be lacking in political ambition. And indeed, while we embrace psychological pragma-
tism, we are under no illusion regarding the ease of implementation. On the contrary, 
implementing it would probably require shifting the boundaries of the ‘conceivable’ quite 
some way out into what is today regarded as ‘radical’.
If its psychological pragmatism is a key higher order principle of our proposal, so is the 
commitment to socializing the endeavor to change consumption patterns. While some 
might argue that individuals have never been taken seriously enough by mainstream 
politics – governments have frequently allowed or even contributed to disinformation 
campaigns about the direct and indirect harms of individual consumption – and that 
presenting clear information to citizens is all that is needed to turn them into agents of 
change, we think that it is warranted to do more and employ communal resources to help 
individuals to live up to the moral demands they face collectively and individually. While 
tasking the community as a whole may not be mandated by considerations of justice 
(though it may well be, too), doing so may have the distinct advantage of working where 
other avenues have only led to backlash. By employing communal resources to empower 
individuals, the policy package under discussion does not let individuals off the hook but 
helps them to act in accordance with reasons which a large majority already accept.
Finally, let us state clearly that the proposal to seek solutions in the field of psycholo-
gically pragmatic policy options is not, in itself, a decision against other kinds of policy 
design. Different kinds of ethically objectionably human behavior may demand different 
policy responses, and there is no reason to think that all responses need to follow the 
principles discussed here.
The proposal is even less to be taken as an implicit statement against political activism, or 
against activism of the more adversarial kind. Activism of all sorts, we think, is needed, and in 
many cases, the state of the world and its laws justifies protest, civil disobedience, and also 
uncivil disobedience. But policy, including policy which is psychologically pragmatic in the 
sketched sense, may be a useful instrument for the growing tool-box of measures against 
the harms we inflict on each other, on non-human animals, and on our joint environment. If 
it is felt that the policy package would not do enough to alleviate these harms (for instance, 
if one believes that the only fully acceptable end is the total abolition of animal production), 
then the answer is: let us do more besides. The proposal developed here targets politics in 
institutions as they currently exist – no more than that, but no less either.
Notes
1. We take it that the harmfulness of the (production and) consumption of animals is no longer 
in need of argumentative support. For references, see: (arguments from animal rights and 
animal welfare:) Coetzee, 1999; DeGrazia, 2002; Foer, 2010; Singer, 1975; (environmental 
arguments:) Hayek et al., 2021; Nordgren, 2011; Schlottmann & Sebo, 2019; Springmann 
et al., 2018; (health-related reasons:) McMichael et al., 2007; Willett et al., 2019; (arguments on 
the relationship between animal production and zoonotic pandemics:) ProVeg e.V, 2020. This 
essay concentrates on the consumption of animal products, but many of its arguments also 
apply to other kinds of harmful consumption.
2. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports a decrease in 
global meat production in its 2020 report (see Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, 2020). However, at 1.7%, the decrease in annual meat production is small, 
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and it is attributed to trade disruptions, animal diseases and the corona pandemic. It there-
fore hardly signals a long-term trend. Decreases in some European countries due to a shift of 
consumption to plant-based meat-substitutes are also minuscule. For example, while the 
production value of plant-based substitutes in Germany increased from 62.4 million Euro to 
85.1 million Euro in the first quarters of 2019 and 2020, respectively, the value of quarterly 
meat production stands at roughly 10 billion Euro. All in all, there are no reasons to expect 
a significant decrease of demand for meat and other animal products in the absence of policy 
aimed at curbing animal product consumption.
3. Animal products, in our paper, encompass meat, milk, eggs, leather, honey etc. and their 
derivative products. However, a policy package of the kind we propose could also be 
introduced only for a part of this range, e.g. meat.
4. e.g. Bicket and Vanner (2016); Baranzini and Carattini (2017).
5. c.f. Bicket and Vanner (2016), Carattini et al. (2018), and Lemken et al. (2018) for reviews of the 
research field.
6. In economic theory, the opportunity cost of a good is defined as the foregone benefit caused 
by choosing the good over its alternatives (taking money spent or kept into account).
7. Diepeveen et al. (2013), Drews and van den Bergh (2015), Carattini et al. (2018), Bachus et al. 
(2019), and Fesenfeld et al. (2020).
8. Diepeveen et al. (2013) reviewed health related policy interventions (alcohol, tobacco, diet, 
and physical activities).
9. see e.g. Bicket and Vanner (2016), with evidence that trust of motives increases acceptance, 
that a perceived risk of free-riding lowers it, and that there is a general preference for ‘carrot’ 
over ‘stick’ measures.
10. Livestock husbandry is also a driver of land-system change to which production of fodder 
contributes. This provides a further reason why livestock farming jeopardizes rights of future 
generations. However, due to the indirect effects, the precise justification would demand 
a more complex treatment than what could be offered within this short paper.
11. We are aware that many would argue that animal rights, strictly speaking, are not compatible 
with any use of animals for human purposes. In fact, we ourselves sympathize with this view. If 
this is the case, the regulation should be read as aiming toward better alignment with the 
demands of animal rights, rather than meeting them in full. Fully meeting the demands of 
animal rights would then remain a longer term goal. In this paper, we opted against 
a discussion in terms of animal welfare, as this political category is too elastic, and in the 
usage of most industry representatives certainly far too weak.
12. According to the reciprocity objection (see, e.g. Lister, 2020; White, 1997), an unconditional 
basic income violates the normative principle of reciprocity in that it allows some people to 
obtain an income without requiring them to contribute to society in return. In our proposal, 
the basic income is constrained to, and motivated by, a particular societal goal: the reduction 
of consumption of animal products, which is in turn motivated by the recognition of animal 
rights and ecological concerns. Thus, an equivalent consideration justifying the provision of 
the income exists. For a similar argument to the effect that reciprocity is not a necessary 
condition for the justice of a policy (proposal), see McKinnon (2003).
13. As already hinted, this is also the reason for which we do not try to estimate its size in order to 
test whether our proposal is empirically consistent.
14. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
15. c.f. Green and Denniss (2018) who argue for this claim, however in the field of climate policy.
16. see footnote 12.
17. See Festinger (1957) and the extensive literature in its wake, for instance, Loughnan et al. 
(2010); or Bastian et al. (2012).
18. Destatis 2021, National Accounts, Table 81,000–0009 https://www-genesis.destatis.de/gen 
esis/online?operation=statistic&levelindex=0&levelid=1609789497347&code=81000; 
accessed on 04.01.2021.
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19. Destatis 2021, National Accounts, Table 81,000–0120: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/gen 
esis/online?operation=statistic&levelindex=0&levelid=1609789497347&code=81000; 
accessed on 04.01.2021.
20. Own calculations based on data from Federal National Accounts: https://www.destatis.de/EN/ 
Themes/Society-Environment/Income-Consumption-Living-Conditions/Consumption- 
Expenditure/Tables/private-consumption-ngt-evs.html, data accessed on 04.01.2021.
21. https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Monatsberichte/2020/10/Inhalte/Kapitel- 
6-Statistiken/6-1-05-bundeshaushalt.html, accessed on 04.01.2021.
22. https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Government/Public-Finance/Expenditure-Revenue-And 
-Financial-Balance-Of-Public-Budgets/Tables/revenue.html, accessed on 04.01.2021.
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